Notes:

C - Concern

CAL - Confirmatory Action Letter Item

E - E-mail L - Letter

LER - Licensee Event Report

NCV - Non-Cited Violation

SUP - Supplemental Inspection Program Item URI - Unresolved Item from inspection

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
C-01	0350 Panel	09/04/02	C.01		Completeness and accuracy of licensee's response to Generic Letter 97-01.	Dunlop	See attachment 4 to 0350 agenda for 1/31/03 mtg.	Dunlop memo to Lipa	9/30/02
C-02	0350 PANEL		C.02	2.d	DG loading - CR # 02-8482.	Falevits	Corrective Action Team inspection	Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/09/03
C-03	0350 PANEL		C.04	4.a & 4.b	Self-assessment/ISEG - why not effective: Look at commitments made to justify removal of ISEG from TS and whether they are still meeting those commitments.	NRR/ Wright	NRR - determine when ISEG no longer rqd; IR 02- 15 & 02-18	Closeout form attached to 12/23/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/23/03
C-04	0350 PANEL		C.05	4.b	How is soft issue of "people performance" addressed via defense in depth = worker/ supv/ mgt-oversight panels/ QA.	Wright	IR 02-15 & 03-09	Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04
C-05	0350 PANEL		C.06	4 n	Operators - clear understanding of their responsibility to us.		J. Dyer site visit	J. Dyer meeting with operators	10/9/02
C-06	0350 PANEL		C.11	1 / N	Review concrete shield building low oxygen content. CR # 02-07472 and 02-07080	Phillips	See Sec, B.7.4 in 4OA3.2 in 02-07 for closure info.	Closeout form attached to 9/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	09/16/03
C-07	0350 PANEL		C.13	N/A	Ongoing phase 3 observations of management and human performance following restart.	Lipa		Closeout form attached to 10/14/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/14/03
C-08	NRR		C.14	1 IN/A	Bulletins 2002-01 and 2002-02 response and acceptance.	NRR	RAI response acceptance.	Closeout form attached to 11/4/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/4/03

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C-09	0350 PANEL		C.15	N/A	Poll staff for differing opinions.	0350 Panel	Close to Item B5.b.1 in Process Plan and 136 in Action Item List.	Closeout form attached to 9/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	09/16/03
C-10	0350 PANEL		C.17	N/A	Evaluate the need to call back CI regarding Allegation RIII-2002-A-0177 (D-B) after the OI Investigation is complete.	0350 Panel	Close and move to an Action Item.	Closeout form attached to 9/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	09/16/03
C-11	0350 PANEL		C.18	2.c	Evaluate Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test Results.	Farber	ILRT Inspection	Closeout form attached to 9/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	09/16/03
C-12	0350 PANEL		C.19	6.b, 6.c, & 6.d	Process Code Exemption Requests for Use of the Midland Head at Davis-Besse.	NRR	Close to relief request approvals.	Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
C-13	0350 PANEL		C.20	6.f	Process Pressure and Temperature Curves for the "New" Vessel Head.	NRR	Close to feeder from NRR to inspection report.	IR 03-04 which is ADAMS ml031320705	05/09/03
C-14	0350 PANEL		C.21	7.a	Issue Letter to the Licensee to Officially "Lift" the Quarantine on the "Old" RPV Head.	RIII		Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
C-15	0350 PANEL		C.22	N/A	Review TSP Amendment - and Advise Panel on the Need for a TIA - Potential TS Change that may be necessary to process before restart.	NRR	see resolution to concern 3 in allegation RIII-2002-A-0110	See Closure form attached to 7/01/03 panel minutes.	07/01/03
C-16	0350 PANEL		C.24	2.b	Evaluate Adequacy of Lower Incore Guide Tube Penetrations - Review the licensee completed corrective actions for the as-found condition of the reactor vessel (e.g., boron deposits, corrosion stains, and potential for leakage at the in-core penetration tubes). Ref. CR 02-07059 and CR 02-02498.	Jacobson/ NRR	NRR to provide approval of acceptance criteria. Jacobson's inspection of NOP/NOT to determine acceptance of test.	Closeout form attached to 11/4/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/4/03

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C-17	0350 PANEL		C.26	2.b	Reactor Bottom Head - A public meeting is scheduled for 11/26 in HQ to discuss the Framatome analyses and the licensee's options. Current licensee plans are to perform a test during normal operating pressure and temperature (NOP/NOT) conditions. Evaluate acceptability of licensee's test.	NRR	NRR provide acceptance criteria approval.	Closeout form attached to 11/4/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/4/03
C-18	0350 PANEL		C.27	5.b	MB3749, 11-30-01, Reduce Pressurizer high level limit from 305 to 228 inches. Licensee has been operating with administrative control of 228 inches. This is an open licensing action. Need to inspect the licensee's operating procedures to see that the licensee has appropriately captured the administrative control.	NRR		Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/09/03
C-19	0350 PANEL			5.d	Can TS 4.55.2.h be met by performing the test at one pressure and then correlating it to the TS pressure value to verify TS flow rate value is achieved?		HPI TIA - what is correct post-mod test.	attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04
C-20	LLTF	02/17/03		N/A	Adequate fire detection capabilities during containment air cooler cleaning utilizing pressure washing.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 7/01/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/01/03
C-21	LLTF	02/17/03		2.c	How will the licensee consider the containment radiation monitors operable?	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/09/03
C-22	LLTF	02/17/03		N/A	Pressurizer safety issue - SE for TM did not fully address USAR.	Thomas		See Closure form attached to 5/27/03 panel minutes.	05/27/03

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C-23	0350	02/21/03		2.c.1	Review D-B response to Generic Letter 98-04 regarding sump clogging. [NOTE: Document determined to be incomplete and inaccurate.]	Passehl	SUMP SERP Package	Closeout form attached to 1/26/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/26/04
C-24	0350	02/21/03		4.d	Both Order and Bulletin 2002-01 Boric Acid Corrosion program response to be tracked as RAM items.	NRR	Acceptance of RAI response and response to Order	Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	
C-25	0350	3./14/03			AOV's not properly sized to open against design pressure in the event of an accident. Some will need modifications/resetting.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 6/17/03 panel mtg. minutes	06/17/03
C-26	0350	3/14/03		5.b	MPR - Electrical Distribution System Analysis (coordination, load flow, degraded voltage, fault protection, and ampacity). Hardware fixes may be required based on calc. results.	Daley	Special inspection feeder to CATI	Closeout form attached to 12/23/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/23/03
C-27	0350	3/14/03	CR 02- 08492	5.b	HPI Pump hydrostatic bearing cooling/lube may be blocked if water source is via piggyback from the sump due to differences in sump strainer size and internal cooling tubing.	Thomas	duplicate of LER 03-02.	Closeout form attached to 6/17/03 panel mtg. minutes	06/17/03
C-28	0350	3/05/03		2.c	Need to ensure unqualified containment coatings (mostly on conduit) are evaluated to ensure they will not lead to any sump blockage.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	
C-29	0350	3/18/03		2.a	Observe and evaluate the control rod drive testing to ensure no leakage and adequate scram times. (Per new IP on Rx head replacement.)	Thomas		attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	
C-30	0350	05/08/03		5.b	Instrument Uncertainty Calculations.	Daley	Special inspection feeder to CATI	Closeout form attached to 9/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	09/16/03

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C-31	0350	04/29/03		חים	Appendix R Thermohydraulic calculations and safe shutdown procedure.	Daley	Special inspection feeder to CATI	Closeout form attached to 9/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	09/16/03
C-32	0350	05/08/03		5.b	Emergency Diesel Generator voltage/frequency control and room temperature.	Daley	Special inspection feeder to CATI	Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
C-33	0350	04/29/03			Management Stability in Radiation Protection Organization.	Riemer	PSB to arrange inspection in July time-frame.	Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	
C-34	0350			5.b	Fuel damaged due to loss of grid straps. (Formerly listed as an LER, however, no LER will be issued for this item).	Lougheed	Done as part of CATI	Closeout form attached to 1/26/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/26/04
C-35	NRC Staff	12/02/03			Requests for Issues: Extent of Condition Reviews for generic implications were inadequate as determined by a Perry review of D-B CRs.	Lipa		Closeout form attached to 01/08/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/08/04
C-36	Panel	12/16/03		, , ,	Requests for Issues: Adequacy of cyclone separator to support HPI operability.	NRR		Closeout form attached to 1/26/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/26/04
C-37	Panel	12/16/03		5.b	Requests for Issues: Acceptability of Steam Generators to operate until mid-cycle outage or beyond March 2004.	NRR		Closeout form attached to 02/19/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/19/04
C-38	Panel	12/18/03			Requests for Issues: Resolve TIA on Fire Protection Issues. (This would include addressing the adequacy of the 1991 SER to provide Appendix R exemptions.)	Passehl		Closeout form attached to 02/19/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/19/04

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
C-39	RRATI	12/18/03			Requests for Issues: Complete Followup RRATI inspection to do round-the-clock inspection of complex control room evolutions.	Lipa		Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04
C-40	NRR Staff	02/09/04			Requests for Issues: From NRR Technical Staff: "Davis-Besse discovered boric acid deposits running down some of the lower head penetration nozzles. They argued that lower head nozzles are not expected to be cracking due to their relatively low temperature during operation. They argued that the deposits could be due to cleaning the deposits from the upper head, even thought there were not clear tracks from above to the points on the nozzles where the boric acid deposits began. They also took some samples and, based on analysis results, argued that the deposits were old. Finally, they installed a sensitive humidity detection system and then did their atpressure/temperature test of the RCS, using that to argue that there are no leaks in the lower head nozzles."	NRR		Closeout form attached to 02/23/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/23/04
C-41	0350 PANEL	02/10/04			Requests for Issues: Document review of licensee's Operational Improvement Plan for operating cycle 14 and subsequent CATI recommendations and comments for required actions prior to restart.	Falevits		attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04
C-42	0350 PANEL	02/19/04			Commenter at Restart meeting on 2/12/04 asked what had happened to Thermo-Lag Orders of May and June 1998 for Davis-Besse. Were the actions completed?	Passehl		Closeout form attached to 02/19/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/19/04

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C-43	DRS Staff	02/19/04			Requests for Issues: Review the adequacy of the licensee's Operations procedures in response to a control room fire. Specifically, focus on the stated Operator expected actions and time line for completing those actions as specified in Attachment 14 of procedure DB-OP-02519, Revision 8.	Lara		Closeout form attached to 02/20/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/20/04
CAL-01	CAL	05/15/02	CAL.1	7.a	Quarantine components or other material from the RPV head and CRDM nozzle penetrations that are deemed necessary to fully address the root cause of the occurrence of degradation of the leaking penetrations. Prior to implementation, plans for further inspection and data gathering to support determination of the root cause will be provided to the NRC for review and comment.	Licensee		Closeout form attached to 7/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/22/03
CAL-02	CAL	05/15/02	CAL.2	7.a	Determine the root cause of the degradation around the RPV head penetrations, and promptly meet with the NRC to discuss this information after you have reasonable confidence in your determination.	NRR & others	02-18 inspections of technical and management root causes & CAL update "E".	Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/09/03
CAL-03	CAL	05/15/02	CAL.3		Evaluate and disposition the extent of condition throughout the reactor coolant system relative to the degradation mechanisms that occurred on the RPV head.	all URI followup inspect.	14, 03-10, 03-22, &	attached to	12/09/03

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CAL-04	CAL	05/15/02	CAL.4	7.a	Obtain NRC review and approval of the repair or modification and testing plans for the existing RPV head, prior to implementation of those activities. Prior to restart of the reactor, obtain NRC review and approval of any modification and testing activity related to the reactor core or reactivity control systems. If the reactor vessel head is replaced in lieu of repair or modification, the replacement must comply with appropriate Commission rules and industry requirements.	Thomas/ Jacobson		attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04
CAL-05	CAL	05/15/02	CAL.5	7.a	Prior to the restart of the unit, meet with the NRC to obtain restart approval. During that meeting, we expect you will discuss your root cause determination, extent of condition evaluations, and corrective actions completed and planned to repair the damage and prevent recurrence.	Lipa	Pending Restart approval meeting with RA.	Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04
CAL-06	CAL	05/15/02	CAL.6	7.a	Provide a plan and schedule to the NRC, within 15 days of the date of this letter, for completing and submitting to the NRC your ongoing assessment of the safety significance for the RPV head degradation.			Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
E-01	Blanch	5/9/02	1	N/A	If cracking on nozzle #3 was only axial, why did the nozzle fall over? In order to do this it had to have circumferential cracking?	Mendiola	Issue response letter to Blanch	ADAMS # ml021560650	6/19/02
E-02	Blanch	5/9/02	2	N/A	If the CRDM had not fallen over, was D-B planning to clean the head, or as in the past, restart with significant boron remaining on the vessel head?	Mandinia	Issue response letter to Blanch	ADAMS # ml021560650	6/19/02

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E-03	Blanch	5/9/02	3	N/A	If circumferential cracking initiates from the OD to the ID, then how is it that circumferential cracking is considered PWSSC? Can I assume that the circumferential cracking is the result of axial cracking?		Issue response letter to Blanch	ADAMS # ml021560650	6/19/02
E-04	Blanch	5/9/02	5	N/A	Is it possible that a through wall axial crack may occur and remain visually undetected due to a tight interference fit at the top of the head and then cause undetected circumferential cracking during an operating cycle?		Issue response letter to Blanch	ADAMS # ml021560650	6/19/02
E-05	Blanch/ Corcoran	5/11/02	1	N/A	Several places in AIT and D-B Root Cause Report state it was very hard to inspect the reactor vessel head; however, doesn't GDC 32 require access?		Issue response to Blanch/Corcoran.	ADAMS # ml021440118	6/11/02
E-06	Lochbaum	07/01/02	NRR L-21		D-B IPE submittal (1993 risk assessment) not available to public. D-B plant-specific LOOP not modeled.	NRR/ NSIR		ADAMS No. ml022610666	9/30/02
E-07	Lochbaum	08/21/02	NRR L-30	N/A	Chairman said LOCA risk is low, when in fact it was high, but the time period was short.			ADAMS No. ml023300539	12/03/02
E-08	Lochbaum	08/21/02	NRR L-31	N/A	Four of the five criteria (RG1.174) that licensees must satisfy for a risk-informed decision were not satisfied when the staff let D-B defer shutdown.			ADAMS No. ml023300539	12/03/02
E-09	Gurdziel	10/02/02	unknown	N/A	Return to Service Plan dated Aug. 21, 2002 - all the pages are presented on ADAMS. Also, nothing in the plan is a commitment to the NRC.		Decided this was not a restart issue.	N/A	02/26/03
E-10	Gurdziel	11/14/02	unknown	5.d	News article of 10/12/02 - Regards Comment on Reactor Vessel "Trailings."	Jacobson	NOP test inspection	attached to	12/16/03

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E-11	Gurdziel	11/20/02	e-mail to Lipa	5.d	Wouldn't you think that a bare metal inspection should be done at pressure and not after pressure is lowered?	Jacobson	inspection	Closeout form attached to 12/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/16/03
E-12	Gurdziel	11/26/02 8:55 pm	e-mail to Lipa	N/A	It doesn't appear likely to me that the D-B operators actually do a primary coolant system visual inspection during hydro after each vessel reassembly.	Jacobson	inspection	Closeout form attached to 12/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/16/03
E-13	Gurdziel	11/26/02 8:55 pm	e-mail to Lipa	N/A	Weren't we supposed to hear by the middle of November 2002 if the total loss of structural material on a reactor vessel head was "significant."	Grobe	tinding iccliance to	ADAMS No. ml030560426	02/25/03
E-14	Gurdziel	11/26/02 10:18 pm	e-mail to Lipa	N/A	The NRC should look at the condition to be expected when weld stress relieving is not used.	Jacobson	NOP test inspection	Closeout form attached to 12/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/16/03
E-15	Gurdziel	12/19/02 7:45 pm	e-mail to Lipa	N/A	What is the FENOC definition of system health? Haven't seen much initiative to fix things, just assess condition.		See System Health Inspection Report.	IR 2002-013	02/26/03
E-16	Gurdziel	12/19/02 7:45 pm	e-mail to Lipa	N/A	What is the status of the containment air coolers (duct work eaten by acid, motors, heat exchangers)?		Close upon closure of LER-08.		04/01/03
E-17	Gurdziel	12/19/02 7:45 pm	e-mail to Lipa		When painting containment, did they use rollers as well as brushes?		No plans to address the distinction.	N/A	02/26/03
E-18	Gurdziel	12/19/02 7:45 pm	e-mail to Lipa	N/A	Would the Polar crane pass inspection if inspected by the State today?	Phillips		Closeout form attached to 7/1/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/01/03
E-19	Gurdziel	02/06/03 8:53 pm	e-mail to Lipa	2.c	Assuming they have 4 reactor coolant pumps and only fix 2, doesn't that leave 2 leaking when they start?	Lougheed	Send letter to Gurdziel	Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03

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E-20	Lochbaum	02/06/03 4:27 pm	e-mail to Grobe	NI/A	Given the as-found condition of the sump reported by FENOC in LER 2002-005, was D-B in conformance with its design and licensing basis?	Passehl	SUMP SRP Package	Closeout form attached to 9/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	09/16/03
E-21	Lochbaum	02/06/03 4:27 pm	e-mail to Grobe	IN/A	Given the as-found condition of the sump reported by FENOC in LER 2002-005, would the ECCS have been able to prevent reactor core damage?	Passehl	SUMP SRP Package	Closeout form attached to 9/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	09/16/03
E-22	Blanch	02/19/03 8:16 am	e-mail to Grobe	N/A	Has D-B changed its policy to require people to follow their chain of command to report safety concerns or concerns to the NRC?	Wright	Mngmt. & Human Performance 2 (IR 02-18)	Closeout form attached to 10/14/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/14/03
E-23	Gunter	02/24/03 8:55 am	e-mail to Grobe	N/A	Did NRC's 0350 Panel review FENOC's analysis to forego inspection and testing of two of the four reactor coolant pumps to assure compliance with TS and regulatory requirements?	Lougheed	Send letter to Gunter.	Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
E-24	Gunter	02/24/03 8:55 am	e-mail to Grobe		If answer to E-23 is yes, what were the NRC's findings?	Lougheed	Sand latter to	Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
E-25	Blanch	03/05/03 10:45 am	e-mail to Grobe	IN/A	Has the NRC conducted an inspection of the Davis-Besse Employee Concerns Program using Inspection Module 40001? If so, please provide a copy of the results.	Wright	Mngmt. & Human Performance 2 (IR 02-18)	Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
E-26	Lochbaum	03/07/03 9:53 am	e-mail to Grobe	3.g	Has the NRC examined how FENOC is performing "at risk changes" to the facility? and if so, is the NRC comfortable with FENOC's at risk changes?	Jacobson	Provide examples of implementation of ARC process - is it fixed??	Closeout form attached to 9/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	09/16/03

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E-27	Blanch	02/10/03 2:15 pm & 2/27/03 8:48 am	e-mail to Grobe	N/A	Why did FENOC choose S. Haber when there are other more qualified individuals that could have been chosen? What are her qualifications? What other studies of safety culture at US Nuclear Plants has Dr. Haber performed? Is NRC aware that Dr. Haber worked for the same company that did the RCA last fall?	Wright	Mngmt & Human	attached to 7/1/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/01/03
E-28	Collins	3/13/03 12:48 pm	e-mail to Grobe		Is NUREG-1756 being used to evaluate safety culture at D-B?		Mngmt & Human Performance 3	attached to 7/1/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/01/03
E-29	Collins	3/13/03 12:48 pm	e-mail to Grobe	4.b	If E-28 no, why not and what alternate method is being used to evaluate safety culture acceptability?		Mngmt & Human Performance 3	Closeout form attached to 7/1/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/01/03
E-30	Lochbaum	5/2/03 10:21 am	e-mail to Hopkins	N/A	What is the status of generic communications regarding the containment sump performance.	Hopkins		Closeout form attached to 5/27/03 panel mtg. minutes	05/27/03
E-31	Blanch	2/26/03 2:00 pm	e-mail to Zwolinski & Grobe	N/A	Jack to provide answer to Paul Blanch: "Please review the enclosed photo that was taken sometime in March 1993. From this photo, it appears that a nozzle was leaking at that time. The reddish brown deposits do not originate from flange leakage. Are we missing something?	Lipa	Lipa and Jacobson called Blanch and provided response via telephone	Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/09/03
E-32	Lochbaum	5/21/03 10:29 am	e-mail to Grobe	NI/A	Grobe to address to Lochbaum: How does the 0350 Panel intend to assure that any findings from the ongoing investigation are indeed addressed before restart?	Phillips - see AITS R03-0150	Letter to Lochbaum	Closeout form attached to 9/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	09/16/03
E-33	Gurdziel	06/18/03 10:34 pm	e-mail to Lipa	1 1/1//	Multiple issues raised regarding information presented in inspection report 03-13.	Lina	Gurdziel.	Closeout form attached to 7/1/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/01/03

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E-34	Gurdziel	7/01/03 10:20 pm	e-mail to Lipa	2.c.1	Respond to E-mail concerning the adequacy of the new sump based on Gurdziel's review of report 03-06.	Grobe	Grobe called Gurdziel on 7/2 and explained details to his satisfaction		07/15/03
E-35	Ballard	7/01/03 7:23 pm	e-mail to OEWEB	NI/A	Respond to individual and cc OEWEB with response to concern about making public safety our number one priority and not being influenced by FirstEnergy.	Strasma	Prepare response and have Grobe issue.	Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
E-36	Various individuals	dates/	multiple e-mails & letters to Dyer & Caldwell	N/A	Respond to individuals regarding request that D-B be permanently shut down. (see AITS R03-0152.	Strasma	Issue response per PA's Plan	Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
E-37	Riccio	7/31/03 10:28 am	e-mail to Grobe	N/A	Respond to Riccio's two questions concerning adequacy of design basis and lack of adequate safety evaluations associated with modifications already installed.	Jacobson		Closeout form attached to 02/20/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/20/04
E-38	Blanch	8/1/03 2:33 pm & 8/5/03 to Grobe	e-mail to Lipa	N/A	Answer to the ten questions asked regarding methodology of site to address hydrogen buildup in containment given inoperability of hydrogen analyzers.	Phillips		Closeout form attached to 11/18/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/18/03
E-39	Blanch	8/19/03 5:45 pm	e-mail to Grobe	N/A	Respond to Blanch's question regarding accuracy of article describing Blaster Worm attack on D-B SPDS system.	Phillips	Final in concurrence chain	Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
E-40	Blanch	8/21/03 9:59 am	e-mail to Grobe	N/A	Respond to Blanch's questions concerning the Slammer virus shutting down the SPDS at Davis-Besse in January 2003, reportability, etc.	Phillips	Final in concurrence chain.	Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
E-41	Blanch	10/6/03 12:45 pm	e-mail to Cwalina	N/A	Respond to Blanch's questions concerning the reasoning for pulling control rods during cooldown and whether such complies with the licensee's TS.	Thomas	Document in inspection report that addresses Rx trip event of 9/30.	Closeout form attached to 12/23/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/23/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
L-01	UCS	5/14/02 & 06/12/02	NRR L-15 & L-17	N/A	D-B failed to incorporate its analyses to address compliance with bulletins and generic letters into the UFSAR, and as such, the UFSAR is not in conformance with 10 CFR 50.71(e).	Mendiola	Per NRC review, only those analyses that result in a change to the existing design basis require an update.	GT# G02-314	12/20/02
L-02	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-01a		Will the D-B FSAR be incompliance with 10 CFR 71(e) prior to restart?	Mendiola	Per letter, D-B is yes	GT#G02-314	12/20/02
L-03	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-01b	N/A	What steps will the NRC staff take to ensure that its past decisions based on the incomplete, inaccurate D-B FSAR were proper?	NRR / RIII	NRR-Interpretation of 50.59 RIII: Response to past practices	GT# G02-314	12/20/02
L-04	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-02a	2.c.1	Will the plant-specific evaluation of GSI-191 vulnerability recommended by the NRC staff to the ACRS in 09/01 be completed for D-B prior to restart?			Closed per Lochbaum letter of 02/10/03	02/10/03
L-05	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-02b	N/A	If L-3 is no, would the NRC staff be guilty of the same tolerance of degraded conditions that caused the current problem?			N/A	2/5/03
L-06	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-02c	2.c	Will all the boric acid deposited inside containment at D-B be found and removed prior to restart?		Licensee plan includes extensive cleaning	IR2002-009 & IR2002-012	11/29/02
L-07	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-02d	2.c	If L-5 is no, what assurance exists that boric acid will not be transported to the sump and contribute to its failure?	Holmberg		IR2002-009 & IR2002-012	11/29/02
L-08	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-03a	2.c	Did FENOC perform a safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 before power washing the D-B head to remove boric acid (WO 00-001846-000)?	Thomas	answer is probably	Closeout form attached to 11/18/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/18/03
L-09	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-03b	2.c	If L-7 is no, what assurance exists against potential damage to safety equipment and components caused by maintenance activities?		Inspection effort of SSDI/Sys Health	IR2002-012 & IR2002-013	02/26/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
L-10	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-04	N/A	Will the CRDM mechanical flanges on the new head be replaced with seal welds prior to restart?	RIII	Licensee has no plans and no reqmts	N/A	2/5/03
L-11	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-05a	N/A	How many of the top 20 managers in place at D-B on Feb. 16, 2002 have left FENOC?	RIII	The NRC does not regulate staffing levels of licensee management.	N/A	2/5/03
L-12	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-05b	N/A	Is the behavior of FENOC management at D-B from 1996 through 2002 better or worse than Ms. VanCleave?	RIII / Berson / EICS	Handle OI results via Enforcement process.	N/A	2/5/03
L-13	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-05c	N/A	If VanCleave is better, will the NRC ban any FENOC managers and supervisors from working in the nuclear industry?		Handle OI results via Enforcement process.	N/A	2/5/03
L-14	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-05d	N/A	If VanCleave is worse, return to L-11 and try again.	RIII / Berson / EICS	Handle OI results via Enforcement process.	N/A	2/5/03
L-15	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-05e	N/A	VanCleave was banned from work at all NPPs. Does the NRC care that fired FENOC managers and supervisors work at other NPPs?	RIII / Berson / EICS	The NRC does not regulate staffing levels of licensee management.	N/A	2/5/03
L-16	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-06a	N/A	Will the results of the Congressional and OI investigations be publicly available prior to restart?	RII / OI	Will follow policy on release of Ol investigations.	N/A	2/5/03
L-17	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-06b		If L-15 is no, how can near-by residents be assured that they were not placed in undue risk by management and workers at D-B?	RII / OI	0350 Panel will do it's job.	N/A	2/5/03
L-18	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-07	2.a	Will the acceptance of the interim head be conditional on commitment from FENOC to install the permanent head during outage when the steam generators are replaced?	NRR	Not required. Replacement head acceptability determined via IR.	IR 2002-007	11/29/02
L-19	UCS	06/12/02	UCS-08	N/A	What was the boric acid corrosion problem at a foreign reactor that caused the NRC to warn some plant owners in 1972?	NRR	Beznan in Switzerland experienced boric acid corrosion	N/A	2/5/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
L-20	UCS	06/19/02	NRR L-18	N/A	Review of D-B UFSAR did not reveal results of safety analysis of several NRC Gis. Licensee not in compliance with 10 CFR 50.71(e).	Mendiola	Same issue as L- 01.	GT# G02-314	12/20/02
L-21	UCS	06/19/02	NRR L-19	N/A	LLTF should examine the appropriateness of using short-duration risk assessments in regulatory space.	Howell		SMRT/LLTF action 3.3.7(3)	11/26/02
L-22	UCS	06/19/02	NRR L-20	N/A	The SDP process should not classify the D-B event as Green.	Grobe	Close with issuance of Red finding letter to licensee.	ADAMS No. ml030560426	02/25/03
L-23	UCS	07/03/02	UCS-09a	N/A	Why did the NRC "accept" the boric acid corrosion program at D-B after determining that over 20% of the program was "unsatisfactory"?	NRR		Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
L-24	UCS	07/03/02	UCS-09b	N/A	Will "acceptable" and "unsatisfactory" stop being synonymous to the NRC?			N/A	2/5/03
L-25	UCS	07/03/02	UCS-10a	N/A	How many times must people around D-B be subjected to American Roulette?			N/A	2/5/03
L-26	USC	07/03/02	UCS-10b	N/A	What tangible steps will NRC take to prevent chronic and systemic management problems from causing another very, very serious nearmiss - or worse - at D-B?		0350 Panel mission	N/A	2/5/03
L-27	UCS	07/03/02	UCS-11a	N/A	Will the NRC allow the public to look at the 1993 D-B risk assessment?	NRR/ NSIR		ADAMS No. ml022610666	9/30/02
L-28	UCS	07/03/02	UCS-11b	N/A	Why did NRC use 1993 D-B risk assessment to develop SDP worksheets when the updated 1999 plant safety assessment was readily available?	NRR		ADAMS No. ml022610666	9/30/02
L-29	UCS	07/03/02	UCS-11c	N/A	If the D-B risk assessment remains "secret" but is the basis for the SDP call, why should the public believe any NRC pronouncement on safety significance derived, in large part, on "secret" information?	NRR		ADAMS No. ml022610666	9/30/02

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
L-30	UCS	07/03/02	UCS-11d	N/A	If the D-B risk assessment remains "secret," will the NRC retain the 0350 Panel indefinitely to compensate for the public being unfairly excluded from access to key information?		Panel will follow MC 0350, then return to ROP.	MC 0350	2/5/03
L-31	UCS	07/03/02	UCS-11e	N/A	Will the NRC require the D-B risk assessment to incorporate the real risk from reactor vessel failure before restart?	NRR		Closeout form attached to 7/1/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/01/03
L-32	UCS	07/03/02	UCS-11f	N/A	Will NRC revamp ROP to enable its inspectors to audit areas non-conservatively omitted from the plant-specific risk assessments?		See ROP description in IMC.	N/A	2/5/03
L-33	UCS	07/03/02	UCS-12a		Did FENOC violate ALARA by repeatedly deferring MOD 94-0025?	RIII	No. All exposures under 5 Rem guideline.	N/A	2/5/03
L-34	UCS	07/03/02	UCS-12b	N/A	Does Region III have a different approach to worker radiation safety than Region IV, given the fact that Callaway was cited for the same poor radiation control practices that RIII let D-B get away with?		No. D-B was issued 2 white findings in RP area for poor rad control practices as well.	N/A	1/7/03
L-35	UCS	07/03/02	UCS-13	1.b & 4.a	What tangible actions has FENOC taken to back up its rosy proclamations and assertions about "questioning attitude and conservative decision-making"?	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 7/1/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/01/03
L-36	UCS	07/03/02	UCS-14a	3.d	Will the NRC require FENOC to conform with UFSAR 5.2.3.2 or revise 5.2.3.2 to match what the company does before restart?		Programs Phase 2 Inspection (IR 03- 09)	Closeout form attached to 9/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	09/16/03
L-37	UCS	07/03/02	UCS-14b	3.d	If the NRC truly believes that FENOC lacks a regulatory commitment to clean the Rx vessel head of highly corrosive material that can cause catastrophic failure, shouldn't the agency undertake getting that regulatory commitment?	Jacobson		Closeout form attached to 9/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	09/16/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
L-38	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-15	N/A	Could operators execute emergency procedures with containment radiation monitors having a mean-time-between-failures of 24 hours?	Simpkins		Closeout form attached to 5/27/03 panel mtg. minutes	05/27/03
L-39	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-16	N/A	Did operability evaluations performed for the Containment Rad monitors consider monitors ability to operate in the atmospheric conditions following an accident?	Simpkins		Closeout form attached to 5/27/03 panel mtg. minutes	05/27/03
L-40	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-17a	N/A	Does FENOC have an engineering calculation/analysis of non-radioactive particulate matter in containment atmosphere following DBAs?	Simpkins		Closeout form attached to 5/27/03 panel mtg. minutes	05/27/03
L-41	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-17b	N/A	If answer to L-36 no, how is it assured that the plant is operating within design bases with respect to 10 CFR 50, App. A, GDC4?	Simpkins		Closeout form attached to 5/27/03 panel mtg. minutes	05/27/03
L-42	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-18	N/A	Is the NRC confident that containment radiation monitors and other components inside containment will not be impaired by stuff in the air from postulated DBAs?	NRR		Closeout form attached to 10/14/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/14/03
L-43	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-19	2.c	Has the extent-of-condition assessment by FENOC included verification that atmospheric sampling lines leading to the Normal Range particulate Radiation Skid are free from boric acid corrosion?	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 5/27/03 panel mtg. minutes	05/27/03
L-44	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-20a	2.c	Will the NRC require FENOC to inspect containment vessel to determine no damage by contact to groundwater caused by a nonconforming condition?			Closed per Lochbaum letter of 02/10/03	02/10/03
L-45	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-20b	2.c	If L-40 no, will NRC's MIC person independently evaluate the potential for MIC damage to the steel containment vessel before restart?			Closed per Lochbaum letter of 02/10/03	02/10/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
L-46	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-21a	2.c	Did FENOC evaluate potential for containment concrete erosion from the non-conforming groundwater flow?			Closed per Lochbaum letter of 02/10/03	02/10/03
L-47	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-21b		If answer to L-42 no, will NRC require FENOC to complete such an evaluation before restart?			Closed per Lochbaum letter of 02/10/03	02/10/03
L-48	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-22	3.d & 3.f	What really caused damage to valve RC- 262?	Jacobson	Programs #2 (03-09) approved plan	Closeout form attached to 5/27/03 panel mtg. minutes	05/27/03
L-49	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-23a		If boric acid was the root cause of the damage to RC-262, should NRC have evaluated the temporary modification in context of RC-2 damage?	Jacobson	Programs #2 (03-09) approved plan	Closeout form attached to 9/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	09/16/03
L-50	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-23b		If boric acid was the root cause of the damage to RC-262, doesn't the back-to-back damage to RC-2 and RC-262 suggest that FENOC's extent-of-condition and problem resolution processes are flawed?	Jacobson	Programs #2 (03-09) approved plan	Closeout form attached to 5/27/03 panel mtg. minutes	05/27/03
L-51	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-24	3.d & 3.f	If boric acid was not the root cause of the damage to RC-262, doesn't it strongly suggest that FENOC's inservice inspection, preventative maintenance, and aging management programs flawed?	Jacobson	Programs #2 (03-09) approved plan	Closeout form attached to 5/27/03 panel mtg. minutes	05/27/03
L-52	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-25	IN/A	When NRC inspectors examine an incident, are they formally trained and instructed to test the licensee's theory by reviewing plant-specific and industry experience?		AIT Procedure 93800	Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
L-53	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-26		Did FENOC perform an extent-of-condition assessment for its containment insulation specification problem?	Thomas	LER 2002-005 followup	Closeout form attached to 1/30/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/30/04

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
L-54	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-27a	1 1 7 1	If L-53 is yes, has the NRC verified its completeness and accuracy?	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 1/30/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/30/04
L-55	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-27b	2.c.1	If L-53 is no, how can NRC be assured that D-B is not unduly vulnerable to GSI-191 related safety problems?		Followup to Bulletin 2003-001.	Closeout form attached to 7/1/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/01/03
L-56	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-28a	N/A	Should the hydrostatic test in 2000 have identified leakage from CRDM nozzle #3?		ASME & LLTF recommendation 3.3.4(8)	LLTF action 3.3.4(8)	2/5/03
L-57	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-28b	N/A	If L-52 is no, should the NRC require licensees to revise hydrostatic testing procedures so they can find leakage?		ASME & LLTF recommendation 3.3.4(8)	LLTF action 3.3.4(8)	2/5/03
L-58	UCS	07/15/02	UCS-29a & UCS-29b	3.a	Does the NRC believe that forcing a company to write 8 CRs really indicates a proper threshold for CRs? If yes, please explain.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 5/27/03 panel mtg. minutes	05/27/03
L-59	UCS	08/05/02	NRR L-26	NI//	Release FOIA 2002-0229 to Paul Gunter and Public Document Room.			ADAMS No. ml022550222	9/10/02
L-60	UCS	08/05/02	NRR L-27	N/A	Requests that LLTF conduct public meetings at least 30 days after FOIA 2002-0229 is released.			ADAMS No. ml022550222	9/10/02
L-61	UCS	08/05/02	NRR L-28	N/A	Remove E. Hackett from LLTF and replace.		Ltr Travers to Lochbaum	ADAMS No. ml022550222	9/10/02
L-62	UCS	08/05/02	NRR L-29	N/A	Evaluate E. Hackett's bias.			ADAMS No. ml022550222	9/10/02
L-63	UCS	09/27/02		NI/A	Prepare response for "NRC Needs New Glasses" letter NOTE: Can't find this document anywhere in ADAMS or on the GT list or NRR list of documents received.	Lipa	Neither Mr. Lochbaum nor the NRC can locate the referenced letter.	N/A	3/11/03
L-64	Gurdziel	08/11/02	G-01	2.c	Has anyone inspected the bottom of the vessel, vessel soleplate, baseplate, anchor bolts, and concrete pedestal for eroded areas?	Holmberg	Extent of condition inspections.	IR2002-009 & IR2002-012	11/29/02

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
L-65	Gurdziel	08/18/02	G-03	2.c	Acid leaking down the head may flow into the holes that are used by the studs causing the threads to no longer be full size. Also, the acid may flow into the grooves of the reactor vessel to reactor head o-rings, changing their dimensions.	HOIMPERA	Extent of condition inspections.	Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
L-66	Gurdziel	09/07/02	G-04	6.c	Check of some existing welds on the replacement head couldn't be done due to the placement of lifting lugs. Couldn't you remove the stainless steel on the bottom surface and test that way?	Lipa		Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
L-67	Gurdziel	09/07/02	G-04	41)	Is the Plant Operations Review Group competent.	Thomas	Develop closure info in light of Jack's view that no one was looking for issues.	attached to 9/16/03 panel	09/16/03
L-68	Gurdziel	09/07/02	G-04		Lack of Quality Control and electrician supervision based on inadequate threads on a bolted connection.	Lipa		Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
L-69	Gurdziel	09/07/02	G-04		Could the missing machine screws on wires to a micro switch be the result of vibration instad of poor assembly?	Lipa		Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
L-70	Gurdziel	09/13/02	G-05		Does the corrective action process allow closure of an item to a work order?	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 5/27/03 panel mtg. minutes	05/27/03
L-71	Gurdziel	09/17/02	G-06		Operator work arounds. To me, this is just a way to avoid fixing equipment.	Lipa		attached to 7/1/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/01/03
L-72	Gurdziel	10/04/02	G-08	2.c	Was the tube rolling device being removed from nozzle #3 because it had successfully met the imposed requirements?	Holmberg		Closeout form attached to 7/1/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/01/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
L-73	Gurdziel	10/5/02	G-09	N/A	Institute a \$ 50M fine against company and fines against many individuals associated with QA, Management, ISEG, and anyone found to be dishonest.	Lipa		Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
L-74	Gurdziel	10/18/02	G-10	N/A	With a QA organization at D-B that provided incompletely reported information, shouldn't the NRC be inspecting the QA function for completeness in reporting at ALL other plants run by FENOC?	Jacobson		attached to 12/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/16/03
L-75	Gurdziel	10/24/02	G-11	N/A	Have the State of Ohio send inspectors to check one overhead crane, like the polar crane, to see if all those things have been corrected.	Phillips		Closeout form attached to 7/1/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/01/03
L-76	Gurdziel	11/21/02	G-14	2.c	Is there another leaking source of the "rust trails" at the bottom of the vessel rather than assuming cavity seal leakage?	Llacohson	NOP/NOT test inspection	Closeout form attached to 11/4/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/4/03
L-77	Gurdziel	11/21/02	G-14	IN/A	I still haven't seen the full transcript of the October meeting or the Management Root Cause to be done on Operations, Corporate QA, and the one on Site QA (4 documents).	Phillips/ Gladden	Multiple ADAMS Nos. ml030150838, ml030240394, ml030240408, ml030240424, ml030240440, and ml030240482.		04/22/03
L-78	Gurdziel	12/05/02	G-15	2.c	May be worthwhile to have a review done of the previously-done incore tube modification process with particular attention to the possibility of weld fracture at the bottom of the original weld (weld metals used and ability to resist boric accident, amount of heat to be deposited by welding, etc.).	Jacobson	Closure form only	Closeout form attached to 12/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/16/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
L-79	Gurdziel	12/05/02	G-15	2.c	If there has been leakage of reactor coolant from the lower incore welds, the contingency repairs proposed by FENOC would exacerbate the potential for boric acid attack of the lower vessel head and incore monitoring wires.	NRR	Only necessary if leaks found for repair, otherwise, N/A	Closeout form attached to 10/14/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/14/03
L-80	Gurdziel	12/07/02	G-16	N/A	Provides many comments on the inadequacies of commitments documented in ADAMS ml023260058.	NRR		Closeout form attached to 1/30/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/30/04
L-81	Gurdziel	12/16/02	G-17	IN/A	For the containment elevator safety glasses incident mentioned in report 02-17, should a for cause fitness-for-duty test have been performed?	Thomas		See Closure form attached to 5/27/03 panel minutes.	05/27/03
L-82	Gurdziel	12/16/02	G-17	N/A	For the NOP/NOT test there should be a process to check for leaks while the reactor is pressurized - the concept of risk is not turned around when risk to a few workers is more important than risk to a larger number of people in Ohio.	Jacobson	NOP/NOT test inspection	Closeout form attached to 12/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/16/03
L-83	Gurdziel	12/16/02	G-17	N/A	How could you roll and weld tubes with air behind them, meet applicable standards, and not have even one question from any credible review organization about the value of what you are doing?	Thomas	Discussed in context of potential repairs to lower incore tubes.	Closeout form attached to 11/18/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/18/03
L-84	Gurdziel	12/16/02	G-17	N/A	If GDC-32 does not apply to the D-B reactor vessel, just how many reactors does it apply to, and why wouldn't it apply to the modification to the in-core tubes of the D-B reactor.	NRR		Closeout form attached to 01/06/04 panel mtg. minutes.	01/06/04
L-85	Gurdziel	2/8/03	G-19	IN/A	Numerous examples of how the licensee misidentifies primary coolant leakage, including reactor coolant pumps having longstanding casing gasket leakage.	Lougheed	Include in letter to Gurdziel addressing RAM item E-19.	Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
L-86	State of Ohio	11/15/02	PE Reg.	N/A	Request to notify Ohio Board of Registration for Professional Engineers if NRC investigation reveals that any Ohio PE acted improperly.	Clayton		Closeout form attached to 7/1/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/01/03
L-87	Transcript rvw 8/15/02	8/15/02		N/A	Mr. Riccio asked what needs to be done to assure that the design basis is maintained and understood, and what's to give the public any confidence that not only the industry and licensee has taken steps to improve its processes. Mr. Grobe said that he will consider it in how we structure the inspections we do at D-B.	Grobe	Design issues included in restart checklist. Special design issues inspection planned.	Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
L-88	Gurdziel	02/16/03	G-20	2.c	Each trail of leakage on the side of the reactor vessel is the result of a failure of the reactor upper head flange gaskets at different times during previous runs. Will they use new gaskets, or re-use the old one.	Thomas	Work Order for replacement flange gaskets	attached to	11/18/03
L-89	Lochbaum	02/10/03		N/A	Were the system assessments at D-B as rigorous as those conducted at Millstone and Cook in flushing out heretofore unidentified non-conforming conditions?	Farber		Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
L-90	Lochbaum	02/10/03		2.all	Did FENOC properly evaluate problems raised during the system assessments at D-B for reportability under 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73?			attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/09/03
L-91	Lochbaum	02/10/03		N/A	Did D-B have sufficient TSP in containment to maintain post-LOCA sump pH less than 7 given the large quantity of boric acid already deposited in containment prior to startup from RFO12, and if not, shouldn't this be an LER?	/DRS	Closure for concern 3 of allegation RIII- 2002-A-0110	attached to 7/1/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/01/03
L-92	Lochbaum	02/10/03		2.c	Looking for leaks in all the wrong places - has the NRC confirmed that the company's NOP/NOT test won't once again miss leaks?	Iaconeon	inspection	Closeout form attached to 12/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/16/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
L-93	Lochbaum	02/10/03		N/A	Has the D-B PRA been revised to account for reactor vessel damage?	S. Burgess		Closeout form attached to 01/06/04 panel mtg. minutes.	01/06/04
L-94	Lochbaum	02/10/03		N/A	The 0350 panel should remain in place until all LLTF issues are resolved and D-B performance indicators are valid and the NRC's inspections have verified adequate performance.			Closeout form attached to 9/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	09/16/03
L-95	Gault	3/8/03		N/A	NRC should not have allowed DB to operate with hole in vessel; unnecessarily put residents on Lake Erie at risk from a LOCA; and DB should be operated by some other company with "safety-focused" personnel.	Phillips	Ltr from Dyer to Gault addressing issues	Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
L-96	Transcript rvw 7/16/02	7/16/02		N/A	Mr. Bruml asked when NRC was going to publish the results of inspections of the RV head. Mr. Grobe mentioned two studies - 1) NRC risk assessment; and 2) detailed analysis being done by RES. Inspection documentation should be out within next month or two.	Grobe	Head Replacement Rpt. & Risk Assessment	Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
L-97	Transcript rvw 8/15/02	8/15/02		N/A	Mr. Lochbaum stated that NRC during inspections and PI verifications, should see if there are bonus plans or incentives that might bias licensee's decision making process. Grobe stated he would forward to DIPM.	Grobe	Send to Carpenter.	Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
L-98	Transcript rvw 8/15/02	8/15/02		N/A	Mr. Gunter stated that he was concerned with the accuracy and document trail regarding FENOC's root cause analysis of the RPV head degradation. Mr. Gunter said that it seems to raise the question about FENOC's devotion to telling the truth. Mr. Grobe stated that the NRC heard the licensee's position that inaccurate information didn't play a role and that will be part of what we evaluate during our inspection in this building block area.	Grobe		Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
L-99	Transcript rvw 8/20/02	8/20/02		N/A	Mr. Keegan wanted specific information on embrittlement and pressurized thermal shock for the reactor at D-B. Mr. Grobe said that we can get you in touch with the right people that can give you more information on pressurized thermal shock.	Grobe		Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
L-100	Transcript rvw 10/16/02	10/16/02		N/A	Mr. Douglas was asking the NRC to consider a photographic procedure to inspect and document the condition of the RVH. Finally, he said, "I certainly do request that you consider the photographic procedure and be sure that it gets stuck in the paper publically, so that we can have some kind of confidence that this place isn't going to - you know where again." Mr. Grobe answered, "Right. We can do that."	Grobe		Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
L-101	Transcript rvw 12/10/02	12/10/02		N/A	Mr. Whitcomb asked why the restart checklist wsa not part of the presentation. Ms. Lipa stated that his suggestion was a good one and theat the NRC would do it in future meetings.	Grobe	hubble mostings	Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
L-102	Transcript rvw 01/14/03	01/14/03		N/A	During a discussion of safety culture and the safety culture assessment of employees, Ms. Lueke asked whether the appraisal form format will be available to the NRC. Mr. Grobe said that he did know that level of detail could get it for her. Ms. Lueke said Okay.	Grobe	Closed in private	Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
L-103	Transcript rvw 01/14/03	01/14/03		N/A	Ms. Lueke had a copy of the NRC report to Congress re the 1985 event at D-B. She referred to sections on underlying causes and asked about procedures that the licensee put in place to prevent future occurrences and if they were followed through. Mr. Grobe stated that there were six separate root cause assessments in different areas and that they will be made publically available shortly.	Grobe		Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
L-104	Transcript rvw 01/14/03	01/14/03		N/A	Mr. Douglas had proposed photographic monitoring techniques in a previous meeting. At this meeting, he restated his proposals, expressed concern that he had not received a response from the NRC. At the end of his presentation, Mr. Douglas requested "that the NRC stays in operation and stays on top [of] Davis-Besse until they do get these photographic and monitoring systems in." Mr. Grobe responded, "Yea, I think Bill and I are here for the long haul so we'll make sure that the changes are lasting." Mr. Douglas then said that he "hopes to see and here them [photographic and monitoring system] soon."	Grobe		Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
L-105	Transcript rvw 01/14/03	01/14/03			One of the subjects that Ms. Muser touched upon was high level waste storage. Mr. Grobe said that he could get her a contact that is involved in the Yucca Mountain project.	Grobe	discussion after	Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
L-106	Gurdziel	06/13/03	G-22	I INI / 🕰	Are licensee's bolting and torquing practices acceptable to the NRC?	Thomas	findings.	Closeout form attached to 9/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	09/16/03
L-107	Gurdziel	07/31/03	G-25		FENOC methodology to look for leaks on the bottom head is inappropriate. My way is better.		inspection	Closeout form attached to 12/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/16/03
LER-01	LER 2002-001	04/11/02		2.d	Review and Evaluate Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoints Greater than allowable LER	Thomas		IR 2002-005	7/25/02
LER-02	LER 2002-002	04/29/02			Review and Evaluate reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage LER	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 11/18/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/18/03
LER-03	LER 2002-003	05/09/02		N/A	Review and Evaluate Fuel Movement in Spent Fuel Pool without required door LER	Thomas		IR 2002-005	7/25/02
LER-04	LER 2002-004	07/22/02			Review and Evaluate containment isolation closure requirements for RCP Seal Injection Valves LER	Thomas		IR 2002-017	12/9/02
LER-05	LER 2002-005	09/04/02		2.c.1	Review and Evaluate Containment Sump LER and supplement. See also Condition Reports 02-3859 & 02-5461			Closeout form attached to 1/26/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/26/04
LER-06	LER 2002-006	11/05/02		5.b	Review and Evaluate EDG Missile Shield LER. See also Condition Report 02-5590 and URI-43.	Falevits	IR 02-19 closed this LER.		07/15/03
LER-07	LER 2002-007	12/11/02		20	Review and Evaluate Leakage from Incore Monitoring Instrumentation LER		inspection	Closeout form attached to 12/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/16/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
LER-08	LER 2002-008	12/31/02			Review and Evaluate Containment Air Coolers collective significance LER. See also Condition Report 02-5563.	Falevits	Corrective Action Team Inspection	Closeout form attached to 02/13/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/13/04
LER-09	LER 2002-009	02/03/03			Degradation of High Pressure Injection thermal sleeves.	Falevits	Corrective Action Team Inspection	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
LER-10	LER 2003-001	03/31/03		5.b	Insufficient Design Margin for Air-Operated Valves	Holmberg		Closeout form attached to 02/13/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/13/04
LER-11	LER 2003-002	05/05/03			Potential Degradation of High Pressure Injection Pumps Due to Debris in Emergency Sump Fluid Post Accident	Jacobson		Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04
LER-12	LER 2003-003	06/10/03		5.b	Requests for Issues: Very Small LOCA may render HPI pumps Inoperable. (Min FLow Mod) - Same as URI-24	Falevits	CATI - close to URI-24.	Closeout form attached to 02/13/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/13/04
LER-13	LER 2003-004	06/15/03			Calibration of RCS RTDs not checked as part of Cross Calibration	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 12/23/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/23/03
LER-14	LER 2003-005	06/30/03			Containment Gas Analyzer Inoperability due to Isolation of Cooling Water	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
LER-15	LER 2003-006	07/21/03			Potential Errors in Analysis of Block Walls Regarding HELB Differential Pressure & Seismic Events.	Rutkowski		Closeout form attached to 02/13/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/13/04
LER-16	LER 2003-007	08/05/03			AC System Analysis Results Show Potential Loss of offsite Power Following Design Basis Accident.	Daley		Closeout form attached to 12/23/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/23/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
LER-17	LER 2003-008	09/08/03			Relays installed in Safety Features Actuation System with insufficient contact voltage ratings	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 11/18/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/18/03
LER-18	LER 2003-009	10/13/03			Loss of offsite power due to grid disturbances	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 11/4/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/4/03
LER-19	LER 2003-010	10/27/03			Potential Inoperability of Decay Heat/Low Pressure Injection System due to loss of valve disc pins.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 01/06/04 panel mtg. minutes.	01/06/04
LER-20	LER 2003-011	11/17/03			Inoperability of Containment Spray Pump No. 1 due to Solid State Trip Device Ground Fault False Trip.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 12/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/16/03
LER-21	LER 2003-012	11/24/03			Inoperability of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine 1 due to Governor Adjustment/Inadequate Response Time	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 12/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/16/03
LER-22	LER 2003-013	12/01/03			Trip of Reactor Protection System During Plant Cooldown	Thomas	,	Closeout form attached to 01/08/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/08/04
LER-23	LER 2003-014	12/16/03			Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System Re-energizes in a Blocked condition.	Rutkowski		attached to 02/17/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/17/04
NCV-01	IR 02-10	10/30/02	NCV		Failure to have procedural guidance to control the construction of scaffolding in a manner that would assure proper operation of ventilation of safety equipment. During a run of EDG 2, scaffolding restricted air circulation and produced a high temperature condition on the EDG.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 5/27/03 panel mtg. minutes	05/27/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
NCV-02	IR 02-09	09/13/02	NCV	5.d	Failure to provide acceptance criteria or requirements to follow inspection plans used for the extent of condition inspections of systems in containment.	Homberg		Closeout form attached to 7/15/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/15/03
NCV-03	IR 02-09	09/13/02	NCV	5.d	Failure to adequately train personnel for VT-2 certification to perform containment area extent of condition walkdowns.	Holmberg		Closeout form attached to 7/15/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/15/03
NCV-04	IR 02-16	01/07/03	NCV	3.h	Failure to placard vehicles used to transport radioactive materials.	Slawinski	RP Special Inspection	Closeout form attached to 7/15/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/15/03
NCV-05	IR 02-06	01/07/03	Green-1	3.h	Failure to conduct adequate surveys of workers prior to leaving the site.	Slawinski	RP Special Inspection	Closeout form attached to 7/15/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/15/03
NCV-06	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01a		Lack of a design basis analysis for containment isolation valve backup air supplies.	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
NCV-07	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01b		Inadequate blowdown provisions for CAC backup air accumulators	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
NCV-08	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01i	2.d	Non-conservative TS value for 90 percent undervoltage relays	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
NCV-09	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01k	2.d	Non-conservative relay setpoint calculation for the 59 percent undervoltage relays	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
NCV-10	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01v		No analytical basis for the setpoint to swap service water system discharge path	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/13/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/13/04

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
NCV-11	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-02a	2.d	SW surveillance test did not use worst case values	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
NCV-12	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-03d	2.d & 3.a	Inadequate corrective actions related to SW pump discharge check valve acceptance criteria.	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	
NCV-13	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-04	2.d	Failure to perform TS surveillance requirement for HPI pump following maintenance.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
NCV-14	IR 03-04	05/09/03	-01	2.d	Failure to Implement Procedures Which Controlled the Fabrication and Installation of Temporary Modifications in Safety Related Systems.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 11/18/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/18/03
NCV-15	IR 03-08	05/30/03	-01	5.i	Failure to properly control access to LHRAs as required by Technical Specifications.	House		Closeout form attached to 7/15/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/15/03
NCV-16	IR 02-19	01/31/03	-02		Failure to Respond to Dosimeter Alarms.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 7/15/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/15/03
NCV-17	IR 03-06	06/17/03	-01		Failure to adequately verify the accuracy of ECCS design calculations. Closed in same report.	Hills		Closeout form attached to 01/06/04 panel mtg. minutes.	01/06/04
NCV-18	IR 03-13	06/16/03	-01		Failure to Properly Implement Work Instructions During the Reinstallation of Electrical Conduit and the Electrical Termination of Operating Power and Indication Power to RC4608A and RC4608B (loop 1 reactor coolant system high point vent valves). Closed in same report.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 11/4/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/4/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
NCV-19	IR 03-13	06/16/03	-02		Inadequately Implementation procedure NS-MD-01023 (Material Engineering Evaluation) During the Procurement Efforts for Replacement SFAS relays. Closed in same report.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 11/18/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/18/03
NCV-20	IR 03-13	06/16/03	-03		Inadvertent Operation of DH7A and DH7B Caused By Inadequate SFAS Component Testing Procedure. Closed in same report.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 11/4/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/4/03
NCV-21	IR 03-15	07/30/03	-01		Failure to Provide Adequate Procedural Guidance for Tightening Fasteners Internal to the High Pressure Injection Pump.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 11/4/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/4/03
NCV-22	IR 03-15	07/30/03	-02		Failure to Perform Work in Accordance With Approved Maintenance Procedures During the Installation of Reactor Coolant Pump Mechanical Seal RTDs.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 11/4/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/4/03
NCV-23	IR 03-15	07/30/03	-03		Failure to Properly Implement System Procedures During the Filling of the Circulating Water System.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 11/18/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/18/03
NCV-24	IR 03-17	09/29/03	-01		TS 3.6.4.1, Containment Hydrogen Analyzers	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 11/18/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/18/03
NCV-25	IR 03-18	10/30/03	-01		Technical Specification 3.5.2 - Inadequate Final Containment Inspection.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 12/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/16/03
NCV-26	IR 03-18	10/30/03	-02		Procedure for Testing the Response Time of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1 Turbine Did Not Adequately Describe the Acceptance Criteria for Successful Completion of the Test.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 12/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/16/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
NCV-27	IR 03-18	10/30/03	-03		Control Room Staff Did Not Adequately Monitor and Control Reactor Coolant System Pressure Which Resulted in CF1B Opening Unexpectedly.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 12/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/16/03
NCV-28	IR 03-18	10/30/03	-04		Failure to Address All Significant Causal Factors Related to the Configuration Control Aspects Associated With the Installation of Unqualified Relays SFAS.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 02/17/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/17/04
NCV-29	IR 03-18	10/30/03	-05		No Procedural Guidance for Performing Immediate Action Maintenance.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 12/23/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/23/03
NCV-30	IR 03-18	10/30/03	-06		Improper Implementation of the Immediate Action Maintenance Process.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 12/23/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/23/03
NCV-31	IR 03-22	12/23/03	-02		Requests for Issues: Square D EDG Relays In the Start and Run Circuits Were Not Rated For the Current Application.	Daley		Closeout form attached to 01/06/04 panel mtg. minutes.	01/06/04
NCV-32	IR 03-10	01/??/04	-07		Requests for Issues: Failure to Verify Adequacy of Short Circuit Protection for Direct Current Circuits	Falevits	CATI		02/18/04
NCV-33	IR 03-10	01/??/04	-08		Requests for Issues: Lack of Calculations to Ensure Minimum Voltage Availability at Device Terminals	Falevits	CATI		02/18/04
SUP-01	IP 95002	09/15/02	IP95002 02.01a	10916	Problem Identification: Determine that the evaluation identifies who (i.e. licensee, self revealing, or NRC), and under what conditions the issue was identified.	Phillips	NRR Tech. Root Cause & Phase I of M&HP Inspection	Closeout form	10/09/03

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SUP-02	IP 95002	09/15/02	IP95002 02.01b	1.a & 1.b	Problem Identification: Determine that the evaluation documents how long the issue existed, and prior opportunities for identification.	Phillips	Cause & Phase I of M&HP Inspection	Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/09/03
SUP-03	IP 95002	09/15/02	IP95002 02.01.c	1.a & 1.b	Problem Identification: Determine that the evaluation documents the plant specific risk consequences (as applicable) and compliance concerns associated with the issue(s) both individually and collectively.	Burgess		Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
SUP-04	IP 95002	09/15/02	IP95002 02.02a	1.a & 1.b	Root Cause and Extent of Condition Evaluation: Determine that the problem was evaluated using a systematic method(s) to identify root cause(s) and contributing cause(s).	Phillips	18, IR 03-04, & NRR Tech Root	Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/09/03
SUP-05	IP 95002	09/15/02	IP95002 02.02b	1.a & 1.b	Root Cause and Extent of Condition Evaluation: Determine that the root cause evaluation was conducted to a level of detail commensurate with the significance of the problem.	Phillips	IR 02-15, IR 02-18, IR 03-04, & NRR	Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/09/03
SUP-06	IP 95002	09/15/02	IP95002 02.02c	1.a & 1.b	Root Cause and Extent of Condition Evaluation: Determine that the root cause evaluation included a consideration of prior occurrences of the problem and knowledge of prior operating experience.	Phillips	IR 02-15, IR 02-18, IR 03-04, & NRR	Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/09/03
SUP-07	IP 95002	09/15/02	IP95002 02.02d	1.a & 1.b	Root Cause and Extent of Condition Evaluation: Determine that the root cause evaluation included consideration of potential common cause(s) and extent of condition of the problem.	Phillips	IR 02-15, IR 02-18, IR 03-04, & NRR	Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/09/03
SUP-08	IP 95002	09/15/02	IP95002 02.03a	N/A	Corrective Actions: Determine that appropriate corrective action(s) are specified for each root/contributing cause or that there is an evaluation that no actions are necessary.	WWright	IR 2002-018, IR	Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/09/03

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SUP-09	IP 95002	09/15/02	IP95002 02.03b	N/A	Corrective Actions: Determine that the corrective actions have been prioritized with consideration of the risk significance and regulatory compliance.	VV riant	IR 2002-018, IR 2002-015.	Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/09/03
SUP-10	IP 95002	09/15/02	IP95002 02.03c	N/A	Corrective Actions: Determine that a schedule has been established for implementing and completing the corrective actions.		IR 2002-013, IR 2002-015, IR 02- 18, & IR 03-12.	attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/09/03
SUP-11	IP 95002	09/15/02	IP95002 02.03d	N/A	Corrective Actions: Determine that quantitative or qualitative measures of success have been developed for determining the effectiveness of the corrective actions to prevent recurrence.	Wright	IR 02-018, 03-12 & IR 02-015.	Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04
SUP-12	IP 95002	09/15/02	IP95002 02.04	N/A	Independent Assessment of Extent of Condition and Generic Implications. Perform a focused inspection(s) to independently assess the validity of the licensee's conclusions regarding the extent of condition of the issues.	Jacobson/ Lipa		Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
SUP-13	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.01.a	N/A	Strategic Performance Area(s) Identification: Using the information contained in the Assessment Action Matrix, identify the strategic performance areas for which performance has significantly declined (e.g. Reactor Safety, Radiation Safety, or Safeguards).		Deficiencies identified and placed in restart checklist, Rev. 2	Closeout form attached to 4/22/03 panel mtg. minutes	04/22/03
SUP-14	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.01.b	N/A	Strategic Performance Area(s) Identification: Inspection Requirements 02.02, 02.07, and 02.08 should always be performed regardless of the strategic performance areas selected for review.	Lina	Redundant to SUP- 15 thru SUP-20 & SUP-104 and SUP- 105.	form attached	05/27/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
SUP-15	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.02.a	N/A	Review of Licensee Control Systems for Identifying, Assessing, and Correcting Performance Deficiencies: Determine whether licensee evaluations of, and corrective actions to, significant performance deficiencies have been sufficient to correct the deficiencies and prevent recurrence.	Falevits		attached to 02/12/04 panel	02/12/04
SUP-16	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.02.b	3.c	Review of Licensee Control Systems for Identifying, Assessing, and Correcting Performance Deficiencies: Evaluate the effectiveness of audits and assessments performed by the quality assurance group, line organizations, and external organizations.	Jacobson	IR 2002-011, IR	attached to 12/16/03 panel	12/16/03
SUP-17	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.02.c	N/A	Review of Licensee Control Systems for Identifying, Assessing, and Correcting Performance Deficiencies: Determine whether the process for allocating resources provides for appropriate consideration of safety and compliance, and whether appropriate consideration is given to the management of maintenance backlogs and correction of work-arounds.	Parker/ Burgess		attached to 01/06/04 panel	01/06/04
SUP-18	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.02.d	N/A	Review of Licensee Control Systems for Identifying, Assessing, and Correcting Performance Deficiencies: Evaluate whether licensee performance goals are congruent with those corrective actions needed to address the documented performance issues.	Jacobson	IR 02-11, IR 02-15, IR 2002-018, 03-09, & weekly performance indicators.		12/16/03

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SUP-19	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.02.e	N/A	Review of Licensee Control Systems for Identifying, Assessing, and Correcting Performance Deficiencies: By reviewing selected aspects of the employee concerns program, ensure that employees are not hesitant to raise safety concerns and that safety significant concerns entered into the employee concern program receive an appropriate level of attention.	Wright	IR 02-11, IR 02-18,	attached to	02/18/04
SUP-20	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.02.f	N/A	Review of Licensee Control Systems for Identifying, Assessing, and Correcting Performance Deficiencies: Evaluate the effectiveness of the organization's use of industry information for previously documented performance issues.	Dhilling	Use OE section of	Closeout form attached to 10/14/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/14/03
SUP-21	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.a 1.a	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Inspection Preparation: Develop an information base to allow the review of the effectiveness of corrective actions by compiling performance information from the licensee's corrective action program, audits, self-assessments, licensee event reports (LERs), and the inspection report record (both the inspection reports and the PIM) for the time period.	Lipa		See Closure form attached to 5/27/03 panel minutes.	05/27/03
SUP-22	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.a 1.b	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Inspection Preparation: Develop an information base to allow the review of the effectiveness of corrective actions by reviewing the compiled information from SUP-21 and sort the issues by the key attributes.	Lipa		See Closure form attached to 5/27/03 panel minutes.	05/27/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
SUP-23	IP95003	09/15/02	IP02- 14/02.03. a.2	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Inspection Preparation: Select a system(s) for focus using the plant specific individual plant evaluation (IPE) and issues identified as part of the performance information.	Farber	ID 2002 O44	Closeout form attached to 10/14/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/14/03
SUP-24	IP95003	09/15/02	IP02- 14/02.03. a.3	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Inspection Preparation: Perform the following inspection requirements for each key attribute focusing on the selected system.	Lipa		See Closure form attached to 5/27/03 panel minutes.	05/27/03
SUP-25	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.a 4.a	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Inspection Preparation: Review inspection reports and critique findings from EP related event response and drills.	Riemer		Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
SUP-26	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.a 4.b	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Inspection Preparation: Review a summary of recent EP corrective actions.	Riemer		Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
SUP-27	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.a 4.c	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Inspection Preparation: Review licensee analyses of corrective actions related to specific findings and general audits where available.	Riemer		Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
SUP-28	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.a 4.d	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Inspection Preparation: Review recent changes to the Emergency Plan (Plan) changes.	Riemer		Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
SUP-29	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.a 4.e	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Inspection Preparation: Develop an inspection plan to address concerns identified as well as the inspection requirements.	Riemer		Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
SUP-30	IP95003	09/15/02	IP02- 14/02.03. b.1	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Design: Assess the effectiveness of corrective actions for deficiencies involving design.	Falevits	IR 2002-011, IR 2002-013, IR 2002- 014, and CATI	attached to	02/18/04
SUP-31	IP95003	09/15/02	IP02- 14/02.03. b.2		Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Design: Select several modification to the system for review and determine if the system is capable of functioning as specified by the current design and licensing documents, regulatory requirements, and commitments for the facility.	Farber	IR 2002-013 & 02- 14	Closeout form attached to 10/14/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/14/03
SUP-32	IP95003	09/15/02	IP02- 14/02.03. b.3	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Design: Determine if the system is operated consistent with the design and licensing documents.	Phillips	IR 02-14	Closeout form attached to 01/06/04 panel mtg. minutes.	01/06/04
SUP-33	IP95003	09/15/02	IP02- 14/02.03. b.4	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Design: Evaluate the interfaces between engineering, plant operations, maintenance, and plant support groups.		IR 02-13, IR 02-14, & RATI.	attached to 1/30/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/30/04
SUP-34	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.c.1	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Human Performance: Assess the effectiveness of corrective actions for deficiencies involving human performance.	Wright	IR 02-15, 02-18, & 03-12	Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
SUP-35	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.c 2.a	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Human Performance: Review specific problem areas and issues identified by inspections to determine if concerns exist in Organizational Practices such as pre-job briefings, control room team work, shift turnover, self-checking and procedural use and adherence.	Passehl	RATI	Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04
SUP-36	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.c 2.b	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Human Performance: Review specific problem areas and issues identified by inspections to determine if concerns exist in Training and Qualifications.	Thomas	IR 2002-009, IR 2002-012, IR 2002- 015,	attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
SUP-37	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.c 2.c	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Human Performance: Review specific problem areas and issues identified by inspections to determine if concerns exist in Communications.	Thomas	IR 2002-015	Closeout form attached to 02/13/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/13/04
SUP-38	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.c 2.d	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Human Performance: Review specific problem areas and issues identified by inspections to determine if concerns exist in Control of Overtime and Fatigue.	Thomas	Assess inspection results	Closeout form attached to 11/4/03 panel mtg. minutes	11/4/03
SUP-39	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.c 2.e	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Human Performance: Review specific problem areas and issues identified by inspections to determine if concerns exist in Human-System Interfaces including work area design and environmental conditions.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
SUP-40	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.c.3	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Human Performance: Conduct EP Emergency Response Organization Performance-Drills, in accordance with Inspection Procedure 82001, with a sampling of shift crews and management teams to assess their ability to implement the Emergency Plan.	Riemer		Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
SUP-41	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.d.1	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Procedure Quality: Assess the effectiveness of corrective actions for deficiencies involving procedure quality.	Falevits	IR 2002-008, IR 2002-009, IR 2002-	Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/09/03
SUP-42	IP95003	09/15/02	IP02- 14/02.03. d.2		Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Procedure Quality: Evaluate the quality of procedures and as applicable, determine the adequacy of the procedure development and revision processes.	Thomas	ID 02-07 ID 02-08	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
SUP-43	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.d.3		Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Procedure Quality: Review a sample of Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIPs) changes against the requirements of the Plan and corrective action assessments. Determine if the EPIP change process is adequate in correcting EPIP related deficiencies and maintaining Plan commitments in EPIP instructions.	Riemer		Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
SUP-44	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.e.1	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Equipment Performance: Assess the effectiveness of corrective actions for deficiencies involving equipment performance, including equipment designated for increased monitoring via implementation of the Maintenance Rule.	Falevits	IR 2002-007, IR 2002-008, IR 2002- 011, IR 2002-013, IR 2002-014, CATI	attached to 02/12/04 panel	02/12/04
SUP-45	IP95003	09/15/02	IP02- 14/02.03. e.2	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Equipment Performance: Determine if the licensee has effectively implemented programs for control and evaluation of surveillance testing, calibration, and post-maintenance testing.	Farber	IR 2002-014	Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
SUP-46	IP95003	09/15/02	IP02- 14/02.03. e.3	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Equipment Performance: Assess the operational performance of the selected safety system to verify its capability of performing the intended safety functions.	Farber	IR 02-14, CATI, (SW, HPI, 4160V)	attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
SUP-47	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.e.4	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Equipment Performance: Review a sample of EP related equipment and facilities (including communications gear) against Plan commitments. Review the adequacy of the surveillance program to maintain equipment and facilities. Review the correction of deficiencies identified by the surveillance program.	Riemer		Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
SUP-48	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.f.1	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Configuration Control: Assess the effectiveness of corrective actions for deficiencies involving configuration control.		IR 2002-011, IR 2002-013, & RATI	Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04
SUP-49	IP95003	09/15/02	IP02- 14/02.03. f.2	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Configuration Control: Perform a walkdown of the selected system. In addition, if the selected system does not directly have a containment over-pressure safety function (such as containment spray), conduct an additional review of such a system. Independently verify that the selected safety system is in proper configuration through a system walkdown. Review temporary modifications to ensure proper installation in accordance with the design information.	Phillips based on research into 02-14.	IR 02-14	Closeout form attached to 10/14/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/14/03
SUP-50.	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.f.3	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Configuration Control: Determine that the work control process uses risk appropriately during planning and scheduling of maintenance and surveillance testing activities and the control of emergent work.		During review of maintenance activities (Maintenance Rule (a)(4))	attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
SUP-51	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.f.4	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Configuration Control: Determine whether the primary and secondary chemistry control programs adequately control the quality of plant process water to ensure long-term integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.	Riemer		Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
SUP-52	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.f.5	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Configuration Control: Assess the programs and controls (tracking systems) in place for maintaining knowledge of the configuration of the fission product barriers including: containment leakage monitoring and tracking, containment isolation device operability (valves, blank flanges), and reactor coolant leak-rate calculation and monitoring.	Phillips	ILRT and NOP inspection report issuances	Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
SUP-53	IP95003	09/15/02	IP95003 02.03.f.6	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Configuration Control: Review the results of the plant specific IPE relative to the system(s) selected. Determine if the IPE is being maintained to reflect actual system conditions regarding system capability and reliability.	S. Burgess		Closeout form attached to 01/06/04 panel mtg. minutes.	
SUP-54	IP95003	09/18/02	IP95003. 02.03.g.1	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Emergency Response Organization Readiness: Assess the effectiveness of corrective actions for deficiencies involving ERO readiness.	Riemer		Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
SUP-55	IP95003	09/18/02	IP95003. 02.03.g.2	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Emergency Response Organization Readiness: Verify that adequate staffing is available on shift for emergencies.	Riemer		Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
SUP-56	IP95003	09/18/02	IP95003. 02.03.g.3	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Emergency Response Organization Readiness: Verify the capability to activate and staff the emergency response facilities and augment the response organization within the requirements of the licensee emergency response plan.	Riemer		Closeout form attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
SUP-57	IP95003	09/18/02	IP95003. 02.03.g.4	I NI//	Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Emergency Response Organization Readiness: Verify licensee ability to meet Emergency Plan goals for activation by implementing Inspection Procedure 71114.03, "Emergency Response Organization Augmentation." If this inspection procedure has been implemented recently, the inspector may exercise judgement as to the need to implement the inspection procedure as part of the 95003 inspection effort. If Attachment 95003.01 is being implemented, there are additional requirements under this key attribute to consider.	Riemer		attached to 12/9/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/09/03
SUP-58	IP95003	09/18/02	IP95003. 02.04.a.1	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Radiation Safety Strategic Performance Area.	Phillips	Per 95003, no inspection required for this strategic area.		07/01/03
SUP-59	IP95003	09/18/02	IP95003. 02.04.a.2	N/A	Assessment of Performance in the Safeguards Strategic Performance Area.	Phillips	Per 95003, no inspection required for this strategic area.	Closeout form	07/01/03

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
SUP-60	IP95003	09/18/02	IP95003. 02.07	N/A	Group the safety performance deficiencies identified during the inspection by apparent root and contributing causes.			Closeout form attached to 7/01/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/01/03
SUP-61	IP95003	09/18/02	IP95003. 02.08	N/A	Compare the team's findings with previous performance indicator and inspection program data to determine whether sufficient warning was provided to identify a significant reduction in safety. Evaluate whether the NRC assessment process appropriately characterized licensee performance based on previous information. The findings from this inspection requirement will not be contained in the inspection report associated with this inspection, but should be documented in a separate report, co-addressed to the appropriate Regional Administrator and the Director of NRR.		Done by LLTF	Closeout form attached to 9/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	09/16/03
SUP-62	IP71007	02/12/03	IP71007	N/A	Perform Reactor Vessel Head Replacement Inspection		IR2002-007, Control Rod Drive inspections	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
SUP-63	IP95002	9/18/02	IP95002	3.h	Complete 95002 Inspection in the Radiation Protection strategic arena.		IR 2003-008, RP 95002 inspection	Closeout form attached to 6/17/03 panel mtg. minutes	06/17/03
URI-01	IR 02-08	10/2/02	-01	2.c	Reactor Operation with Pressure Boundary Leakage	Phillips		attached to 1/30/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/30/04
URI-02	IR 02-08	10/2/02	-02	3.f	Reactor Vessel Head Boric Acid Deposits	Phillips		Closeout form attached to 1/30/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/30/04

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
URI-03	IR 02-08	10/2/02	-03	3.f	Containment Air Cooler Boric Acid Deposits	Phillips		Closeout form attached to 1/30/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/30/04
URI-04	IR 02-08	10/2/02	-04	2.c	Radiation Element Filters with Rust Deposits	Phillips		Closeout form attached to 1/30/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/30/04
URI-05	IR 02-08	10/2/02	-05	N/A	Service Structure Modification Delay	Phillips		Closeout form attached to 1/30/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/30/04
URI-06	IR 02-08	10/2/02	-06	N/A	Failure to follow the corrective action procedure and complete a prescribed corrective action for adverse trends in RCS unidentified leakage	Phillips		Closeout form attached to 1/30/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/30/04
URI-07	IR 02-08	10/2/02	-07	3.d	The licensee's failure to have a boric acid corrosion control (BACC) program procedure appropriate to the circumstances.	Phillips		Closeout form attached to 1/30/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/30/04
URI-08	IR 02-08	10/2/02	-08	3.d	Failure to implement the boric acid corrosion control program procedure.	Phillips		Closeout form attached to 1/30/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/30/04
URI-09	IR 02-08	10/2/02	-09	3.a& 4.b	Failure to implement the corrective action program procedure	Phillips		Closeout form attached to 1/30/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/30/04
URI-10	IR 02-08	10/2/02	-10	4.d	Completeness and accuracy of information	Passehl		Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
URI-11	IR 02-10	10/30/02	-02	7.5	Containment Isolation Closure Requirements for RCP Seal Injection Valves MU66AD	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 5/27/03 panel mtg. minutes	05/27/03
URI-12	IR 02-12	11/29/02	-01	2.c & 3.f	Potential leakage at the reactor vessel incore penetration tubes	Jacobson	NOP/NOT test inspection	Closeout form attached to 12/16/03 panel mtg. minutes	12/16/03
URI-13	IR 02-12	11/29/02	-02	2.c	Potential impact of corrosion on the ground function of electrical conduit in containment	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 10/09/03 panel mtg. minutes	10/09/03
URI-14	IR 02-12	11/29/02	-03	3.a & 4.d	Potential failure to follow the procedure for Raychem splice removal on electrical cables	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
URI-15	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01c	2.d	Failure to perform comprehensive Moderate Energy Line Break analysis	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
URI-16	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01d	2.d	Lifting of Service Water Relief Valves	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04
URI-17	IR-02-14	02/26/03	-01e	ו איני ו	Inadequate SW pump room temperature analysis	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
URI-18	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01f	2.d	Inadequate Service Water pump room steam line break analysis	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
URI-19	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01g	2.d	Inadequate cable ampacity analysis	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
URI-20	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01h	2.d	Inadequate flooding protection for the SW pump house	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
URI-21	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01j	2.d	Poor quality calculation for 90 percent undervoltage relays.	Falevits	CATI determined issue not ready for closure.	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
URI-22	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-011	2.d	Inadequate calculations for control room operator dose (GDC-19) and offsite dose (10 CFR Part 100) related to HPI pump minimum flow valves	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	
URI-23	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01m	2.d	Other GDC-19 and 10 CFR Part 100 issues	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
URI-24	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01n	2.e	Requests for Issues: HPI Pump Operation Under Long Term Minimum Flow (also LER-12 & C-43)	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04
URI-25	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01o	5.b	Requests for Issues: Some small break LOCA sizes not analyzed	Falevits	CATI determined issue not ready for closure.	Closeout form attached to 02/13/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/13/04
URI-26	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01p	5.b	Inadequate SW flow analysis	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/13/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/13/04

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
URI-27	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01q	5.b	Inadequate SW thermal analysis	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/13/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/13/04
URI-28	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01r	5.b	Inadequate UHS inventory analysis	Jacobson		Closeout form attached to 02/20/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/20/04
URI-29	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01s		No Valid Service Water Pump Net Positive Suction Head Analysis	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04
URI-30	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01t	5.b	SW source temperature analysis for AFW	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
URI-31	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-01u	5.b	Inadequate short circuit calculations	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
URI-32	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-02b	5.b	Inadequate SW system flow balance testing	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04
URI-33	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-03a		Inappropriate SW pump curve allowable degradation	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	
URI-34	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-03b	5.b	Repetitive failures of SW relief valves	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
URI-35	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-03c	5.b	Non-Conservative Differences in UHS Temperature Measurements	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
URI-36	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-03e	1 h h	Non-Conservative containment air cooler mechanical stress analysis	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	
URI-37	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-05	1 2 D	Question regarding the definition of a passive failure.	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/13/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/13/04
URI-38	IR 02-14	02/26/03	-06	2 (1)	Question regarding licensee compliance with code relief valve requirements.	Holmberg		Closeout form attached to 02/12/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/12/04
URI-39	IR 02-16	01/07/03	White-1	3.h	Failure to adequately evaluate radiological hazards	Slawinski	RP Special Inspection	Closeout form attached to 7/15/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/15/03
URI-40	IR 02-16	01/07/03	White-2	1.5 N	Failure to obtain timely and suitable measurements	Slawinski	RP Special Inspection	Closeout form attached to 7/15/03 panel mtg. minutes	07/15/03
URI-41	IR 02-17	12/09/02	FIN	N/A	Inappropriate Licensee Notification of NRC Inspector Activity & failure of licensee personnel to enforce an obvious OSHA safety deficiency.	Thomas		Closeout form attached to 5/27/03 panel mtg. minutes	05/27/03
URI-42	IR 02-17	12/09/02	FIN-03	3.a & 4.b	Inadequate Implementation of the Corrective Action Process Which Led to Not Identifying a Potentially Reportable Issue regarding the containment air coolers.	Falevits	CATI	Closeout form attached to 02/13/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/13/04

RAM#	Source	Date	Issue No.	Restart Checklist Item	Issue	Contact	Plan	Closure Reference	Closure Date
URI-43	IR 02-19	01/31/03	-01	5.b	Final Evaluation of Apparent Cause Evaluation for LER 50-346/2002-006-00. See also CR 02-5590 [EDG Exhaust].	Falevits		Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04
URI-44	IR 03-15	07/30/03	-04		Potential Inability for HPI Pumps to Perform Safety Related Function (see LER 03-02)	Jacobson		Closeout form attached to 02/18/04 panel mtg. minutes	02/18/04
URI-45	IR 03-15	07/30/03	-05	Yellow	Failure to Effectively Implement Corrective Actions for Design Control Issues Related to Deficient Containment Coatings, Uncontrolled Fibrous Material and Other Debris (see LER- 02-05)	Passehl		Closeout form attached to 1/26/04 panel mtg. minutes	01/26/04